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Abstract
From skipped exercise classes to last-minute cancellation of dentist appointments, underuti-
lization of reserved resources abounds, arising from uncertainty about the future and further
exacerbated by present bias— the constant struggle between our current and future selves. The
contingent second price mechanism proposed by Ma et al. [23] provably optimizes utilization,
but relies on the assumption that agents rationally optimize their expected utility, and fails
to be incentive compatible when agents are present-biased. In this paper, we unite resource
allocation and commitment devices through the design of contingent payment mechanisms. We
propose the two-bid penalty-bidding mechanism, which assigns the resources to agents who are
willing to accept the highest no-show penalties, determines a market-clearing penalty level, but
allows each assigned agent to increase her own penalty in order to better counter her present
bias. We prove the existence of a simple dominant strategy equilibrium, regardless of an agent’s
level of present bias or degree of “sophistication” (the ability to forecast the change in one’s
future preferences). Via simulations, we show that the proposed mechanism not only improves
utilization, but also achieves higher social welfare than mechanisms that are welfare-optimal for
settings without present bias.
1 Introduction
“It was a disaster,” recalled Matt Juszczak, co-founder of Turnstyle Cycle and Bootcamp, a fitness
company that offers cycling and bootcamp classes across five studios in the Boston area. “When
we opened our first indoor cycling location in Boston’s Back Bay, we saw 40 to 50 no-shows and
late cancels in an average day— that’s over 15,000 in a year!”1 Like many well-known exercise
franchises, Turnstyle allowed customers to reserve class spots several days in advance with a first-
come-first-serve reservation system. However, ambitious customers, overestimating the amount of
time in their schedules or their desire to exercise in the future, often snag a spot only to ultimately
cancel last-minute or simply not show up.
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1https://business.mindbody.io/education/blog/tips-reduce-no-shows-and-late-cancels-your-fitness-business, vis-
ited September 1, 2018.
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Figure 1: Log in page of the squash court reservation system at the Harvard Hemenway Gymnasium.
Similarly, the squash courts at Harvard’s Hemenway Gymnasium used to allow students and
faculty to reserve time-slots to play squash up to seven days ahead of time. Even though the
reservation window has since been reduced to three days because of high no-show rates, the gym
operators still feel the need to display the warning shown in Figure 1 every time someone logs
into the reservation system.2 For examples from other domains, organizers of free events report to
Eventbrite that their no-show rate can be as high as 50%,3 and even for prepaid events organized
through Doorkeeper, the fraction of no-shows can be has high as 20%.4 Studies of outpatient
clinics report that no-shows can range from 23-34%, with no-shows costing an estimated 14% of
daily revenue as well as impacting efficiency.5
Common to all these problems is the presence of uncertainty, self-interest and down-stream
utilization decisions on the part of participants, together with the interest of a social planner (a
gym manager, an event organizer, a clinic) that a resource be used and not wasted. Beyond revenue
and efficiency motivations, utilization can have positive externalities, for example members of a
cycling studio derive motivation from fellow bikers in class. Complicating the problem is present
bias, the constant struggle between our current and future selves. Consider that at the beginning
of the week, someone might prefer a spin class over watching TV on Friday, reserving a spot in a
class ahead of time, but by the time Friday comes around prefer to just watch TV instead.
Recognizing the problem of low utilization, many reservation systems are now charging a penalty
for not showing up: Turnstyle now charges a $20 penalty for missing a scheduled class,6 patients
who miss appointments at hospitals may need to pay a fee that is not covered by insurance,7 and
organizers of some conferences collect a deposit that is returned only to students who actually
attended talks.8 These approaches can be viewed as simple, first-come-first serve schemes, for some
choice of no-show penalty.
In recent work, Ma et al. [23] model agents’ future value from using a resource as a random
variable, and propose the contingent second price mechanism (CSP). The mechanism takes into ac-
count the maximum penalty that an individual participant would be willing to face, which provides
a good signal for the individual’s reliability. The CSP mechanism has a simple dominant strategy
equilibrium, and provably optimizes utilization among a large family of mechanisms with desired
2https://recreation.gocrimson.com/recreation/facilities/Hemenway, visited September 1, 2018.
3https://www.eventbrite.com/blog/asset/ultimate-way-reduce-no-shows-free-events/, visited 5/6/2019.
4https://www.doorkeeper.jp/event-planning/increasing-participants-decreasing-no-shows?locale=en,
visited May 6, 2019.
5https://jaoa.org/article.aspx?articleid=2671437, visited May 6, 2019.
6https://kb.turnstylecycle.com/policies/what-is-the-late-cancel-no-show-policy, visited May 6, 2019.
7https://huhs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/HDS%20New%20Patient%20Welcome%
20Letter-eps-converted-to.pdf, visited May 10th, 2018.
8https://risingstarsasia2018.ust.hk/guidelines.php, visited May 10th, 2018.
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properties. The mechanism, however, relies on the assumption that agents rationally optimize their
expected utility, does not accommodate the needs of individuals with different levels of present bias,
and can even fail to be incentive compatible for present-biased agents since in this case an agent’s
expected utility may no longer be monotone in the no-show penalty.
1.1 Our results
In this paper, we unite through contingent payment mechanisms the allocation of scarce resources
under uncertainty and the design of commitment devices for overcoming present bias.
We generalize the model proposed in Ma et al. [23], and decompose an agent’s value from using
a resource as the sum of a random value experienced at the time of using the resource (modeling
for example the opportunity cost and the present pain of going to the gym), and a fixed value that
is not gained until later in the future (consider, for example the future benefit from better health).
We incorporate the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model for time-inconsistent preferences [20, 25],
such that when an agent is making a decision on whether to use a resource, the future benefit from
using a resource is discounted by a present bias factor. Agents may also have different levels of
“sophistication”— a naive agent believes she does not discount the future, a sophisticated agent is
able to perfectly forecast the change in her future preferences, and a partially naive agent resides
somewhere in between.
In period 0, an agent’s private information corresponds to the distribution of her immediate
value from using the resource, the future value from using the resource, and what she believes to
be her present bias factor. A coordination mechanism elicits information from each agent, assigns
each of m resources to the agents, and may determine both a base payment that an assigned agent
always pays, as well as a penalty for each assigned agent in the event of a no-show. In period 1,
each assigned agent learns her immediate value from using the resource, and with knowledge of the
penalty and the future value, decides whether or not to use the resource.
The two-bid penalty-bidding mechanism works as follows. In period 0, the mechanism elicits a
bid from each agent, representing the highest penalty the agent is willing to accept for the option to
use the resource for free. The resources are assigned to the m highest bidders, and the mechanism
asks each assigned agent to report a penalty that is weakly higher than the m+1th bid, representing
the actual amount she would like the mechanism to charge in the case of a no-show. The main
result (Theorem 1) establishes a simple, dominant strategy equilibrium of the two-bid penalty
bidding mechanism, regardless of an agent’s value distribution, level of present bias, or degree of
sophistication. The mechanism also satisfies voluntary participation and runs without a budget
deficit.
We show via simulations that the mechanism not only improves utilization, but also achieves
higher social welfare than the standard m + 1th price auction, which is the welfare-optimal mech-
anism for settings without present bias. In particular, in a population where agents have different
levels of present bias, the more biased agent benefit more under two-bid penalty bidding, in com-
parison to the outcome under the m + 1th price auction. While naive agents do not see the value
of commitment and generally do not take any commitment device when offered [6, 4], the two-bid
penalty bidding mechanism is able to help, since a commitment device is designed through the
mechanism, and not accepting a commitment device is not an option.
1.2 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, this current paper is the first to study resource assignment in the
presence of uncertainty and present bias. The closest related work is on the design of mechanisms
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to improve resource utilization where agents have uncertain future values [23], or to incentivize
reliable demand-side response in electric power systems [21, 22]. The proposed welfare-optimal and
reliable contingent payment mechanisms, however, no longer have dominant strategy equilibrium if
agents are present-biased, in which case an agent’s expected utility may no longer be monotonically
decreasing as the penalty increases. This work builds on Ma et al. [23], generalizing the model to
incorporate present bias, and makes use of two-bid penalty bidding to align incentives for agents
with any level of present bias or sophistication. Crucially, the proposed mechanism does not need
to assume any knowledge about agents’ level of bias or value distributions.
As noted by Ma et al. [23], contingent payments have arisen in the past in the context of oil
drilling license auctions [16], royalties [7, 10], ad auctions [28], and selling a firm [12]. Payments
that are contingent on some observable world state also play the role of improving revenue as well
as hedging risk [27]. In our model, in contrast, payments are contingent on agents’ own downstream
decisions and serve the role of commitment devices. In regard to auctions in which actions take
place after the time of contracting, Atakan and Ekmekci [2] study auctions where the value of taking
each action depends on the collective actions by others, but these actions are taken before rather
than after observing the world state. Courty and Li [9] study the problem of revenue maximization
in selling airline tickets, where passengers have uncertainty about their value for a trip, and may
decide not to take a trip after realizing their actual values. The type space considered there is
effectively one-dimensional, and present bias is not considered.
Laibson [20] introduced quasi-hyperbolic discounting for modeling time-inconsistent decision
making, where in addition to the standard exponential discounting, all future utilities are discounted
by an additional present bias factor. Present-biased agents have been further classified into those
who are sophisticated, and fully aware of their present bias and can anticipate their future self-
control problem, and those who are naive, and blissfully unaware of their present bias and believe
they will still have time-consistent behavior in the future [25]. O’Donoghue and Rabin [25] find
through analysis that naivete is associated with procrastinating immediate-cost activities and doing
immediate-reward activities too soon, while sophistication lessens the degree of procrastination but
intensifies the doing-too-soon. O’Donoghue and Rabin [26] also study how the role of choice affects
procrastination, and introduce the idea of a partially naive agent, who is aware of present bias but
underestimates the degree of this bias. Researchers have also attempted to estimate the present
bias factor in the real world based on observed behavior, however, there has not been consensus
about the distribution of present bias in the population [3, 8, 13]
In a different setting, Kleinberg and Oren [18] consider how to modify the sequencing of tasks
available to individuals in order to help a present-biased agent adopt a more optimal sequence of
tasks. Kleinberg et al. [19, 17], Gravin et al. [15] later extended this work to consider sophisticated
agents, the interaction between present bias and sunk-cost bias, and agents whose present bias
factors are uncertain. There is no uncertain values or costs in these models, and no contention for
limited resources. Other researchers have also examined the role of various kinds of commitment
devices to mitigate present bias. Laibson [20] examines illiquid assets (that have long-term returns
but cannot be realized immediately) as a self-control mechanism. Beshears et al. [5] also use
liquidity as a commitment mechanism, testing how the design of contracts with varying levels of
liquidity affects demand for commitment devices used to restrict spending. Gin et al. [14] test a
savings account designed to serve as a commitment device to help with smoking cessation. By
bundling a “want” activity (listening to one’s favorite audio book) with a “should” activity (going
to the gym), Milkman et al. [24] evaluate the effectiveness of temptation bundling as a commitment
device to tackle two self-control problems at a time.
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2 Preliminaries
We first introduce the model for the assignment of m homogeneous resources (leaving a discussion
of the generalization to heterogeneous resources to Section 3.1). There is a set of agents N =
{1, 2, . . . , n} and three time periods. In period 0, the value of each agent i ∈ N for using a
resource is uncertain, represented by Vi = V
(1)
i + v
(2)
i (the time line is more formally presented in
the next subsection). The period 1 value from using the resource V
(1)
i is a random variable with
cumulative distribution function (CDF) Fi, whose exact (and potentially negative) value is not
realized until period 1. The period 2 value v
(2)
i ≥ 0 models the expected future benefit agent i
derives, if she uses a resource in period 1.
Agents are present-biased, that at any point of time, agent i discounts her utility from all future
periods by a factor of βi ∈ [0, 1]. The agents may not be fully aware of their bias, however, and
agent i believes that when making decisions, she will only discount her future utility by a factor of
β˜i ∈ [βi, 1]. An agent with β˜i = β1 = 1 is rational and does not discount her future utility. An
agent with β˜i = βi < 1 is said to be sophisticated, and is fully aware of the degree of her present
bias. An agent with β˜i = 1 and βi < 1 is said to be naive, believing that she will make rational
decisions in the future, and an agent with β˜i ∈ (βi, 1) is said to be partially naive.
Let θi = (Fi, v
(2)
i , βi, β˜i) denote agent i’s type, and θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) denote a type profile. The
tuple θ˜i = (Fi, v
(2)
i , β˜i) is agent i’s private information at period 0, when the assignment of resources
is determined. Each allocated agent decides on whether to use the resource at period 1, after she
privately learns the realization v
(1)
i of V
(1)
i . Define V
+
i , max{Vi, 0}. Following Ma et al. [23], we
make the following assumptions about Fi for each i ∈ N :
(A1) E
[
V +i
]
> 0, which means that a rational agent gets positive value from using the resource
with non-zero probability, thus the option to use the resource has positive value.
(A2) E
[
V +i
]
< +∞, which means that agents do not get infinite expected utility from the option
to use the resource, thus would not be willing to pay an unboundedly large payment for it.
(A3) E [Vi] < 0, meaning that being forced to always use the resource regardless of what happens
is not favorable for any agent, so that no agent would accept any unboundedly large no-show
penalty for the right to use a resource.9
We now provide a few examples of different models for agent types.
Example 1 ((ci, pi) model). The future value for agent i for using a resource is v
(2)
i = wi > 0,
however, she is able to do so only with probability pi ∈ (0, 1) and at a period 1 opportunity cost
modeled by V
(1)
i = −ci. With probability 1− pi, agent i is unable to show up to use the resource.
This hard constraint can be modeled as V
(1)
i taking value −∞ with probability 1−pi. See Figure 2.
We have E
[
V +i
]
= (wi − ci)pi > 0, and E [Vi] = −∞ thus (A1)-(A3) are satisfied.
Example 2 (Exponential model). The opportunity cost for an agent to use the resource in period
one is an exponentially distributed random variable with parameter λi, (i.e. −V (1)i ∼ Exp(λi)). If
the agent used a resource, she gains a future utility of v
(2)
i = wi > 0. See Figure 3. The expectation
of E
[
V
(1)
i
]
is λ−1i , thus E [Vi] = λ
−1
i + wi and (A1)-(A3) are satisfied when wi < λ
−1
i .
9 Regardless of the degree of present bias or sophistication, an agent for which (A3) is violated is willing to accept
a 1 billion dollar no-show penalty, (almost) always use the resource, and get a non-negative utility in expectation.
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V
(1)
i =
{ −ci, w.p. pi
−∞, w.p. 1− pisome text v
fi(v)pi1− pi
−ci−∞
Figure 2: Distribution of V
(1)
i under the (ci, pi) type model.
fi(v) =
{
λie
λiv, v ≤ 0,
0, v > 0.
some text v
fi(v)
λi
Figure 3: Agent period 1 value distribution under the exponential type model.
2.1 Two-Period Mechanisms
We consider two-period mechanisms defined by M = (R, x, s, t), following the timeline proposed
in Ma et al. [23]. At period 0, each agent makes a report ri from some set of messages R. Let
r = (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ Rn denote a report profile. Based on the reports, an allocation rule x =
(x1, . . . , xn) : Rn → {0, 1}n assigns the right to use the resources to a subset A ⊆ N of at most m
agents, namely those agents for whom xi(r) = 1. xi(r) = 0 for all i 6= A. Each agent is charged
si(r) in period 1, and the mechanism also determines the penalty ti(r) for each allocated agent
i ∈ A for no-shows (we set ti(r) = 0 for i /∈ A).
The timeline of a two-period mechanism is as follows:
Period 0:
• Each agent i ∈ N reports ri ∈ R to the mechanism based on the knowledge of θ˜i.
• The mechanism allocates the resource to a subset of agents A ⊆ N with |A| ≤ m, thus xi(r) = 1
for alli ∈ A and xi(r) = 0 for all i /∈ A.
• The mechanism determines the base payment si(r) for all agents i ∈ N , and the penalty ti(r)
for each allocated agent i ∈ A.
Period 1:
• The mechanism collects si(r) from each agent.
• Each allocated agent i ∈ A privately observes the realized values v(1)i of V (1)i , and decides on
whether to use the resource based on v
(1)
i , v
(2)
i and ti(r).
• The mechanism collects the penalty ti(r) from each allocated agent i ∈ A if she did not use the
resource.
Example 3 ((m+1)th price auction). The standard m+1th price auction for assigning m resources
can be described as a two-period mechanism, where the report space is R = R. Ordering agents in
decreasing order of their reports, s.t. r1 ≥ r2 ≥ . . . rn (breaking ties randomly), the allocation rule
is xi(r) = 1 for all i ≤ m, xi(r) = 0 for i > m. Each allocated agent is charged si(r) = rm+1, and
all other payments are zero. The m+ 1th price auction does not make use of any penalties.
Example 4 (Generalized contingent second price mechanism). The generalized contingent second
price (GCSP) mechanism [23] for assigning m homogeneous resources collects a single bid from
each agent, allocates the right to use resource to the m highest bidders, and charges the m + 1th
highest bid, but only if an allocated agent fails to use the resource. Formally, R = R. Ordering the
agents s.t. r1 ≥ r2 ≥ . . . rn (breaking ties randomly), we have xi(r) = 1 for i ≤ m, xi(r) = 0 for
i > m, ti(r) = maxi′ /∈A ri′ , and all other payments are 0.
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We assume that agents are risk-neutral, expected-utility maximizers with quasi-linear utility
functions and quasi-hyperbolic discounting for future utilities.
An agent i who is allocated a resource faces a two part payment (z, y), where z is the period 1
penalty the agent pays in the case of no-show, and y is the period 1 base payment the agent always
pays. When period 1 arrives and the agent learns value v
(1)
i (the realization of V
(1)
i ), the agent
discounts the future by βi, and believes that her utility from using the resource is v
(1)
i + βiv
(2)
i − y.
The utility from not using the resource is −y− z. Based on this, the agent uses the resource if and
only if
v
(1)
i + βiv
(2)
i − y ≥ −y − z ⇔ v(1)i ≥ −z − βiv(2)i , (1)
breaking ties in favor of using the resource. Let 1{·} be the indicator function, and define ui(z),
the expected utility of the agent when facing penalty z, as
ui(z) , E
[
(V
(1)
i + v
(2)
i )1{V (1)i ≥ −z − βiv(2)i }
]
− zP
[
V
(1)
i < −z − βiv(2)i
]
. (2)
The actual expected utility of an allocated agent facing two-part payment (z, y) is ui(z) −
y. Under a two-period mechanism M, and given report profile r, agent i’s expected utility is
xi(r)ui(ti(r))− si(r).
Agents believe that they will make decisions as if they have present-biased factor β˜i, and will
decide to use the resource in period 1 if and only if
v
(1)
i ≥ −z − β˜iv(2)i . (3)
Therefore, an agent believes that when facing a penalty z, her expected utility will be
u˜i(z) , E
[
(V
(1)
i + v
(2)
i )1{V (1)i ≥ −z − β˜iv(2)i }
]
− zP
[
V
(1)
i < −z − β˜iv(2)i
]
. (4)
We call u˜i(z) the subjective expected utility function of the agent. For sophisticated agents who
are able to perfectly predict their future decisions (i.e. β˜i = βi), u˜i(z) and ui(z) coincide.
Throughout the paper, we assume that if allocated, agents’ decisions in period 1 are influenced
by their present bias, but are otherwise rational. The interesting question is to study an agents’
incentives regarding reports in period 0, which are made based on u˜i(z) − y, i.e., based on an
agent’s belief about her expected utility. For any vector g = (g1, . . . , gn) and any i ∈ N , we denote
g−i , (g1, . . . , gi−1, gi+1, . . . , gn).
Definition 1 (Dominant strategy equilibrium). A two-period mechanism has a dominant strategy
equilibrium (DSE) if for each agent i ∈ N , for any type θi satisfying (A1)-(A3), there exists a report
r∗i ∈ R such that ∀ri ∈ R, ∀r−i ∈ Rn−1,
xi(r
∗
i , r−i)u˜i(ti(r
∗
i , r−i))− si(r∗i , r−i) ≥ xi(ri, r−i)u˜i(ti(ri, r−i))− si(ri, r−i).
Let r∗(θ) = (r∗1, . . . , r∗n) denote the report profile under a DSE given type profile θ.
Definition 2 (Voluntary participation). A two-period mechanism satisfies voluntary participation
(VP) if for each agent i ∈ N , for any type θi satisfying (A1)-(A3), and any report profile r−i ∈ Rn−1,
xi(r
∗
i , r−i)u˜i(ti(r
∗
i , r−i))− si(r∗i , r−i) ≥ 0.
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Voluntary participation requires that each agent believes that she has non-negative expected
utility under her dominant strategy, given that she makes present-biased but otherwise rational
decisions in period 1 (if allocated), regardless of the reports made by the rest of the agents. Vol-
untary participation allows an agent to have negative utility at the end of period 1. We cannot
charge unallocated agents without violating VP, thus si(r) ≤ 0 for all i /∈ A, for all report profiles
r ∈ Rn.
The expected revenue of a two-period mechanism M is the total expected payment made by
the agents to the mechanism in the DSE, assuming present-biased but otherwise rational decisions
in period 1:
revM(θ) ,
∑
i∈N
(
si(r
∗) + xi(r)ti(r∗)P
[
V
(1)
i < −ti(r∗)− βiv(2)i
])
. (5)
Definition 3 (No deficit). A two-period mechanism satisfies no deficit (ND) if, for any type profile
θ that satisfies (A1)-(A3), the expected revenue is non-negative: revM(θ) ≥ 0.
The utilization achieved by mechanismM in the DSE is the expected number of used resources,
which is equal to the summation of the probability with which each assigned agent uses the resource:
utM(θ) ,
∑
i∈N
xi(r
∗)P
[
V
(1)
i ≥ −ti(r∗)− βiv(2)i
]
. (6)
The expected social welfare achieved by mechanism M is the total expected value derived by
agents from using the resources:
swM(θ) ,
∑
i∈N
xi(r
∗)E
[
(V
(1)
i + v
(2)
i )1{V (1)i ≥ −ti(r∗)− βiv(2)i }
]
. (7)
Our objective is to design mechanisms that maximize expected social welfare. We do not
consider monetary transfers as part of the social welfare function. The reason ti(r
∗) appears is that
it affects the decision of the allocated agents in period 1.
3 The Two-Bid Penalty Bidding Mechanism
In this section, we introduce the two-bid penalty bidding mechanism, and prove that agents with
(ci, pi), exponential, or uniform model types have simple dominant strategies under the two-bid
penalty bidding mechanism.
Definition 4 (Two-bid penalty bidding mechanism). The two-bid penalty bidding mechanism col-
lects bids b¯ = (b¯i, . . . , b¯n) from agents in period 0, and reorders agents in decreasing order of b¯i s.t.
b¯1 ≥ b¯2 ≥ · · · ≥ b¯n (breaking ties randomly).
• Allocation rule: xi(b) = 1 for i ≤ m, xi(b) = 0 for i > m.
• Payment rule: the mechanism announces b¯m+1, elicits a second bid bi ≥ b¯m+1 from each assigned
agent i ≤ m, and sets ti(b) = bi. ti(b) = 0 for all i > m, and si(b) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
The two-bid penalty bidding mechanism first asks agents to bid on the maximum penalties they
are willing to accept for the option to use the resource for free, and assigns the resources to the
highest bidders. The mechanism then asks each assigned agent to bid a penalty that is weakly
higher than the m + 1th bid, which is the amount she would like the mechanism to charge her in
case of a no-show.
8
We first prove some useful properties of agents’ subjective expected utility function u˜i(z).
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Lemma 1. Given any agent with type θi that satisfies (A1)-(A3), the agent’s subjective expected
utility u˜i(z) as a function of the penalty z satisfies:
(i) u˜i(0) ≥ 0, limz→+∞ u˜i(z) ≤ E [Vi].
(ii) u˜i(z) is right continuous, i.e. limz↓z∗ u˜i(z) = u˜i(z∗) for all z∗ ≥ 0. Moreover, u˜i(z) is upper
semi-continuous, meaning that for all z∗ ≥ 0, limz↑z∗ u˜i(z) ≤ u˜i(z∗).
Proof. We first prove part (i). It is obvious that u˜i(0) ≥ 0 given (4). For the limit as z → ∞,
observe that u˜i(z) can be rewritten as:
u˜i(z) =E
[
(V
(1)
i + β˜iv
(2)
i )1{(V (1)i + β˜iv(2)i ) ≥ −z}
]
+ (1− β˜i)v(2)i P
[
(V
(1)
i + β˜iv
(2)
i ) ≥ −z
]
− zP
[
(V
(1)
i + β˜iv
(2)
i ) < −z
]
=E
[
max{V (1)i + β˜iv(2)i , − z}
]
+ (1− β˜i)v(2)i P
[
(V
(1)
i + β˜iv
(2)
i ) ≥ −z
]
. (8)
By the monotone convergence theorem, the first term of (8) converged to E
[
V
(1)
i + β˜iv
(2)
i
]
=
E
[
V
(1)
i
]
+ β˜iv
(2)
i as z → ∞. The second term is upper bounded by (1 − β˜i)v(2)i , therefore
limz→+∞ u˜i(z) ≤ E
[
V
(1)
i
]
+ v
(2)
i = E [Vi] holds.
For part (ii), max{V (1)i + β˜iv(2)i , − z} is a continuous function in z, therefore its expecta-
tion E
[
max{V (1)i + β˜iv(2)i , − z}
]
is also continuous in z. P
[
(V
(1)
i + β˜iv
(2)
i ) ≥ −z
]
is right con-
tinuous, implying the right continuity of u˜i(z) as well. The fact that (1 − β˜i)v(2)i ≥ 0 and that
P
[
(V
(1)
i + β˜iv
(2)
i ) ≥ −z
]
only jumps up when it’s not continuous guarantees limz↑z∗ u˜i(z) ≤ u˜i(z∗)
for all z∗ ≥ 0.
For any penalty z, we now define U˜i(z) as the optimal, expected utility that agent i believes
she has, if agent i can choose to be charged any penalty that is at least z, i.e.
U˜i(z) = sup
z′≥z
u˜i(z
′). (9)
The following lemma makes use of Lemma 1, and proves the continuity, monotonicity, and the
existence of a zero-crossing for U˜i(z)— the maximum penalty an agent is willing to accept, if the
agent can choose to be charged any penalty that is weakly above this amount.
Lemma 2. Given any agent with type θi that satisfies (A1)-(A3), the agent’s subjective expected
utility U˜i(z) as a function of the minimum penalty z satisfies:
(i) U˜i(z) is continuous and monotonically decreasing in z.
(ii) There exists a zero-crossing z0i s.t. U˜i(z
0
i ) = 0 and U˜i(z) < 0 for all z > z
0
i .
10Lemma 3.2 in Ma et al. [23] proved that for a rational agent without present bias, her expected utility as a
function of the penalty z is continuous, convex, and monotonically decreasing with z. These properties no longer
hold for agents with present bias.
9
zu˜i(z)
ci−β˜iwi
z0i
(a) u˜i(z).
z
U˜i(z)
ci−β˜iwi z0i
(b) U˜i(z).
Figure 4: Expected utility functions of a sophisticated agent with (ci, pi) type, with ci−βiwi > 0.
Proof. For part (i), the monotonicity of U˜i(z) is obvious, and the continuity of U˜i(z) is implied by
the right continuity of u˜i(z). For part (ii), observe that limz→∞ U˜i(z) < 0 since limz→∞ u˜i(z) ≤
E [Vi] < 0 implies that there exists Z ∈ R s.t. u˜i(z) < 0 for all z > Z. The continuity of U˜i(z) then
implies that defining
z0i , sup{z ∈ R | U˜i(z) ≥ 0},
we must have U˜i(z
0
i ) = 0 and U˜i(z) < 0 for all z > z
0
i .
The following example illustrates the expected utility functions of an agent with (ci, pi) type (see
Example 1), and shows that there may not exist a dominant strategy under the CSP mechanism.
Example 5. Consider a sophisticated agent whose type follow the (ci, pi) model, who is assigned a
resource and charged a no-show penalty z. With probability 1− pi, the agent is not able to use the
resource at all and pays the penalty z. With probability pi, the agent is able to use the resource
at a cost of ci, but will use the resource if and only if βiwi − ci ≥ −z ⇔ z ≥ ci − βiwi. When
ci − βiwi > 0, the agent’s expected utility as a function of the no-show penalty is of the form:
ui(z) =
{ −z, if 0 ≤ z < ci − βiwi,
(wi − ci)pi − (1− pi)z, if z ≥ ci − βiwi,
and we know u˜i(z) = ui(z) since the agent is sophisticated. See Figure 4a. Intuitively, ci − βiwi is
the minimum penalty the agent needs to be charged, so that she will show up to use the resource
when she is able to. When z < ci − βiwi, the agent ends up always paying the penalty, which is
too small to incentivize utilization. U˜i(z) of this agent is as shown in Figure 4b. The maximum
penalty the agent is willing to accept is z0i = (wi − ci)pi/(1− pi).
There is no dominant strategy for this agent under the CSP mechanism. Consider the allo-
cation of a single resource. If the highest bid among the rest of the agents satisfies maxi′ 6=i bi′ ∈
[ci − β˜iwi, z0i ), the agent gets positive utility from bidding bi = z0i , getting allocated and charged
maxi′ 6=i bi′ as penalty. However, if maxi′ 6=i bi′ < ci − β˜iwi, bidding bi = z0i results in negative
utility— the agent will be allocated, but and charged a penalty that is too small to overcome her
present bias. In this case, the agent is better off bidding bi = 0 and not getting allocated.
We now state and prove the main theorem of this paper.
Theorem 1 (Dominant strategy equilibrium of the two-bid penalty bidding mechanism). Given
(A1)-(A3), under the two-bid penalty bidding mechanism, it is a dominant strategy for each agent
i ∈ N to bid b¯∗i = z0i . If agent i assigned a resource and given a minimum penalty z, it is then
a dominant strategy to bid b∗i = arg maxz≥z u˜i(z). Moreover, the mechanism satisfies voluntary
participation and no deficit.
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Figure 5: Expected utility functions of two agents in Example 6.
Proof. We first consider an agent who is assigned a resource, and asked the mechanism to bid an
amount that is at least z. The highest expected utility U˜i(z) when the agent can choose any penalty
weakly higher than z is achieved at some arg maxz≥z u˜i(z) because of the right continuity of u˜i(z).
Since whichever amount an agent bids as bi will be the penalty she is charged by the mechanism,
it is a dominant strategy to bid b∗i = arg maxz≥z u˜i(z).
Given that an assigned agents will get expected utility U˜i(z) when she is asked to bid a penalty
at least z, U˜i(z) is effectively her expected utility function in the first round of bidding. With the
monotonicity of U˜i(z) and the fact that the minimum penalty is determined by the m+ 1
th highest
bid, it is standard that an agent bids in DSE the highest “minimum penalty to choose from” that
she is willing to accept, which is z0i .
Example 6. Consider the allocation of one resource to two agents with (ci, pi) types, where:
• c1 = 10, p1 = 0.8, w1 = 16, β1 = β˜1 = 0.5,
• c2 = 6, p2 = 0.5, w2 = 10, β2 = β˜2 = 0.8.
When z < c1−β1w1 = 2, agent 1 never uses the resource. On the other hand, c2−β2w2 < 0 means
that agent 2 uses the resource with probability p2 given any non-negative penalty. ui(z) = u˜i(z)
for i = 1, 2 since both agents are sophisticated, and the expected utility functions of the two agents
are as shown in Figure 5.
Under the second price auction, agents will bid in DSE b∗1,SP = u˜1(0) = 0 and b
∗
2,SP = u˜2(0) =
(w2−c2)p2 = 2— the value of the option to use the resource without any no-show penalty. Knowing
that she will never show up without penalty, agent 1 is not willing to pay any positive amount for
the option to use the resource. Agent 2 gets assigned the resource and charged no penalty, achieving
social welfare (w2 − c2)p2 = 2 and utilization p2 = 0.5.
Under the two-bid penalty bidding mechanism, the agents bid in DSE b¯∗1 = z01 = (w1−c1)p1/(1−
p1) = 24, and b¯
∗
2 = z
0
2 = (w2− c2)p2/(1− p2) = 4. Agent 1 is therefore assigned and will bid b∗1 = 4
when asked to choose a penalty weakly above b¯∗2 = 4, since u˜1(z) is monotonically decreasing in z for
z ≥ c1− β˜1w1 = 2. As a result, the two-bid penalty bidding achieves social welfare (w1−c1)p1 = 4.8
and utilization p1 = 0.8— both are higher than those under the second price auction.
3.1 Discussion
For rational agents with β˜i = βi = 1, the subjective expected utility as a function of the penalty
u˜i(z) is monotonically decreasing, therefore u˜i(z) and U˜i(z) coincide. In this case, the equilibrium
outcome under the two-bid penalty bidding mechanism coincides with that under the m+ 1th-price
generalization of the CSP mechanism.
Since u˜i(z) is what an agent considers during the bidding process, in period 0 a naive agent
behaves as if she was rational with the same value distribution. In period 1, however, present bias
11
will take effect, and the naive agent may make sub-optimal decisions. The actual expected utility a
naive agent gets from participating in the mechanism, therefore, may be negative, despite the fact
that she is willing to participate, and that she believes she will get non-negative expected utility.
Taking the derivative of the subjective expected utility u˜i(z) (4) w.r.t. β˜i, we can show that for
two agents i and i′ who are identical except that β˜i > β˜i′ , u˜i(z) ≥ u˜i′(z) for all z ≥ 0. As a result,
z0i ≥ z0i′ . This implies that an agent who believes that she is less present-biased will bid higher
under both the two-bid penalty bidding mechanism and the m+ 1th price auction.
The CSP mechanism is provably utilization-optimal among a large family of mechanisms with a
set of desirable properties [23]. The two-bid penalty bidding mechanism, however, does not optimize
utilization— the reason is that the actual present bias factor does not affect a naive agent’s bid,
and thus it is still possible for a very biased naive agent to be assigned under the two-bid penalty
bidding mechanism but never show up. On the other hand, the m + 1th auction may not assign
the resource to this agent, and for this reason may achieve higher utilization and welfare.
For assigning multiple heterogeneous resources, we can consider a model with m resources M =
{a, b, . . . ,m}, where each agent i ∈ N has a random value Vi,a = V (1)i,a +v(2)i,a for using resource a ∈M .
In this case, u˜i,a(z) and U˜i,a(z) can be defined similarly to (4) and (9). The two-bid mechanism can
be generalized through the use of a minimum Walrasian equilibrium price mechanism that computes
the assignment, and the minimum penalty each agent faces using {U˜i,a(z)}i∈N,a∈M [11, 1, 23]. As
a second step, each assigned agent is then are asked to report a weakly higher penalty that she
wants to be charged by the mechanism. The same DSE analysis then holds.
4 Simulation Results
In this section, we adopt the exponential type model introduced in Example 2, and compare in
simulation the social welfare and utilization achieved by different mechanisms and benchmarks for
assigning five homogeneous resources. Additional simulations for the exponential type model are
presented in Appendix A, together with similar results when assuming the (ci, pi) type model (see
Example 1) or a uniform type model where agents’ period 1 values are uniformly distributed.
Recall that in the exponential model, −V (1)i ∼ Exp(λi), v(2)i = wi thus E [Vi] = λ−1i + wi
where −λ−1i is the expected period 1 opportunity cost for using the resource. Agents’ expected
utility functions and DSE bids are provided in Appendix B. We consider a type distribution in the
population, where the value wi and the expected opportunity cost λ
−1
i,a for each agent i ∈ N are
both uniformly distributed:
λ−1i ∼ U[0, L],
wi ∼ U[0, λ−1i ].
With wi < λ
−1
i with probability 1, assumptions (A1)-(A3) are satisfied. The simulation results
are not sensitive to the choices of parameter L, and we fix L = 10 for the rest of this section.
4.1 Varying Resource Scarcity
Fixing the number of resources at m = 5, we study the impact of varying the scarcity of the
resource, by examining the outcome under different mechanisms and benchmarks as the number of
agents n varies from 2 to 30. The “First Best” benchmark is the highest utilization or welfare that
is achievable without violating voluntary participation or no deficit. The “first-come-first-serve”
(FCFS) benchmark assumes a random order of arrival, effectively assigning to a random subset of
m agents, and does not charge any base payment or penalty.
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Figure 6: Social welfare and utilization for naive agents with exponential types.
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Figure 7: Social welfare and utilization for sophisticated agents with exponential types.
Naive Agents We first consider the scenario where all agents are naive and unaware of their
present bias. The present bias factor βi is assumed to distribute uniformly on [0, 1], and all agents
believe that they have β˜i = 1. As the number of agents n varies from 2 to 30, we compute the
average social welfare and utilization over 10,000 randomly generated profiles under the different
mechanism and benchmarks, as shown in Figure 6.
When the number of agents is small, the outcomes under the two-bid penalty mechanism, the
m + 1th price auction, and first-come-first-serve are similar, since all three mechanisms effectively
assign the resources to all agents, without charging any penalty. As the number of agents increases,
the two-bid penalty bidding achieves higher social welfare and significantly higher utilization than
the m + 1th price auction (which is welfare optimal for rational agents without present bias), and
does this without charging any payments from agents who actually show up. Both mechanisms
significantly outperform the first-come-first-serve benchmark, which is analogous to the reservation
system widely used in practice.
Sophisticated Agents We now consider settings with fully sophisticated agents, whose present-
biased factor are distributed as βi ∼ U[0, 1], but β˜i = βi for all i ∈ N . We vary the number
of agents from 2 to 30, and show the average social welfare and utilization over 10,000 randomly
generated economies in Figure 7.
Similar to the setting with naive agents, the two-bid penalty bidding mechanism achieves higher
welfare and utilization than the m+ 1th price auction. These gains are slightly smaller than in the
setting with naive agents, moreover, the m + 1th price auction achieves relatively higher gain in
utilization when compared to the first-come-first-serve baseline. This improved performance of the
13
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Figure 8: Welfare and utilization for naive agents with exponential types, fixing βi = i/n.
m+ 1th price auction in the case of sophisticates comes out because sophisticated agents are able
to adjust their bids depending on their present bias level, and avoid the situation where a naive
agent bids too much, gets assigned, but rarely show up, resulting in very low utilization, welfare,
and negative actual expected utility for the agent herself.
In Appendix A.1, we provide additional simulation results for exponential types as n varies, for
the settings where all agents are fully rational (β˜i = βi = 1), and where all agents are partially
naive (in which case we assume β˜i ∼ U[βi, 1]). The outcome for partially naive agents is between
the outcome for fully naive agents and fully sophisticated agents. For fully rational agents, the
two-bid penalty bidding mechanism achieves slightly worse welfare than the m+ 1th price auction,
which is provably optimal for this setting. Two-bid penalty bidding, however, still achieves higher
utilization and also a significantly better outcome than the FCFS benchmark.
4.2 Impact on Agents with Different Degrees of Bias
In this section, we consider a population of agents with varying levels of present bias, and study
the different outcomes for agents with different degrees of present bias under various mechanisms
and benchmarks. We consider the same distribution of the expected opportunity cost λ−1i and the
future value wi as in the earlier setting, but fix the total number of agents at n = 30, and also fix
the preset bias factor of agent i at βi = i/n for all 1,000,000 randomly generated economies. The
smaller an agent’s index is, the more present-biased the agent.
Naive Agents We first consider the scenario where all agents are naive. The average (per
economy) welfare and utilization of each agent is as shown in Figure 8. Under the first-best welfare
and the first-best utilization, agents with different degrees of bias achieve the same welfare and
utilization. This is because the agents all have the same distribution of λ−1i and wi, and only
differ in their bias factor βi. The full-information first best knows types of agents, and adjusts the
penalties accordingly, so that there is no difference between agents who are more or less biased.
Also note that naive agents behave in period 0 as if they are rational, therefore all agents bid in the
same way despite their degree of present bias, and are allocated with the same average probability.
From Figure 8b, we see that all agents achieve higher utilization under two-bid penalty bidding
than under the m + 1th price auction. Agents who are less biased (higher indices) achieve higher
utilization than those who are more biased (lower indices), but agents who are more biased achieve
a higher gain in two-bid penalty bidding compared with the m+ 1th price auction. Perhaps more
importantly, Figure 8a shows that the less biased agents obtain much higher welfare under the
m + 1th price auction. The two-bid penalty bidding mechanism, in comparison, helps the agents
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Figure 9: Welfare and utilization for sophisticated agents with exponential types, fixing βi = i/n.
who are more biased to achieve significantly higher social welfare, and at the same time results
in a slight lower welfare for the least-biased agents: this decrease is because for the least biased
agents, her own period 1 decision will be close to optimal, and charging a penalty may sometimes
incentivize her to use the resource even when the actual future value is smaller than present cost.
Overall, the outcome under the two-bid penalty bidding mechanism is significantly more equi-
table for agents with all levels of bias. It is also worth noting that while naive agents do not see
the value of commitment and generally do not take any commitment device when offered [6, 4], the
two-bid penalty bidding mechanism is able to help the naive agents, since a commitment device is
designed through the mechanism, and not accepting a commitment device is not an option.
Sophisticated Agents We now consider the setting where all agents are sophisticated. The
average welfare and utilization of each agent is as shown in Figure 9. The first observation is
that under the m + 1th price auction, the welfare and utilization for the most biased agents is
effectively zero, while the least biased agents achieve better welfare and utilization than the first-
best outcome. This is because when the bids of sophisticated agents factor in the level of present
bias, the more biased agents bid lower than the less biased agents, and therefore get assigned with
lower probability. The more biased sophisticated agents bid lower under two-bid penalty bidding
as well, and as a result the two-bid penalty bidding is not able to achieve the same level of social
welfare for all agents. Nevertheless, it achieves large improvements for the most biased part of the
population.
5 Conclusion
We propose the two-bid penalty-bidding mechanism for resource allocation in the presence of un-
certainty and present bias. We prove the existence of a simple dominant strategy equilibrium
regardless of an agent’s value distribution, level of present bias, or degree of sophistication. Simu-
lation results show that the proposed mechanism not only improves utilization, but also achieves
higher welfare than mechanisms that are welfare-optimal for settings without present bias.
Ongoing work includes empirical work in collaboration with exercise studios and event orga-
nizers in order to better understand people’s behavior, with the goal of seeking to separate the
impact of uncertainty and present bias on utilization. Another interesting direction for future
work is to generalize the model to allow for more than two time periods, where agents may ar-
rive asynchronously, when uncertainty unfolds gradually over time, and where resources can be
re-allocated.
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Appendix
A Additional Simulation Results
A.1 Additional Results for Exponential Model
We first consider the identical setup as analyzed in Section 4, where agents have exponential types,
and there are m homogeneous resources to assign. We present the results as the number of agents
varies, for settings where agents are all fully rational, or where they are all partially naive.
Fully Rational Agents Figure 10 presents the average welfare and utilization of 10,000 randomly
generated economies, assuming all agents are fully rational with β˜i = βi = 1. The two-bid penalty
bidding mechanism achieves slightly worse welfare than the m+1th price auction, which is provably
optimal for this setting. Two-bid penalty bidding, however, still achieves higher utilization and also
significantly better outcome in comparison to FCFS.
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Figure 10: Social welfare and utilization for rational agents with exponential types.
Partially Naive Agents We now consider partially naive agents, where each agent has βi ∼
U[0, 1], and β˜i ∼ U[βi, 1]. The average welfare and utilization over 10,000 random economies
are as shown in Figure 11. The outcome is in between the fully sophisticated and the fully naive
settings discussed in the body of the paper.
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Figure 11: Social welfare and utilization for partially naive agents with exponential types.
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Figure 12: Social welfare and utilization for naive agents with (ci, pi) types.
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Figure 13: Social welfare and utilization for sophisticated agents with (ci, pi) types.
A.2 The (ci, pi) Type Model
In this section, we compare the performance of different mechanisms and benchmarks for the (ci, pi)
type model introduced in Example 1. Agents’ expected utility functions and DSE bids are provided
in Appendix B. We consider a type distribution in the population, where the value wi, cost ci, and
reliability pi are all uniformly distributed:
wi ∼ U[0, L],
ci ∼ U[0, wi],
pi ∼ U[0, 1].
With ci < wi and pi ∈ (0, 1) with probability 1, assumptions (A1)-(A3) are satisfied almost surely.
The results are not sensitive to the choices of parameter L, and we fix L = 10 for all results
presented in the rest of this section.
A.2.1 Varying Resource Scarcity
Fixing the number of resources at m = 5, we first examine the outcomes as the number of agents
varies from 2 to 30. When all agents are naive with βi ∼ U[0, 1] and β˜i = 1. The average social
welfare and utilization over 10,000 randomly generated profiles are as shown in Figure 12. For
economies with fully sophisticated agents, where present-biased factors are distributed as βi ∼
U[0, 1], but β˜i = βi for all i ∈ N , the social welfare and utilization average over 10,000 randomly
generated economies are as shown in Figure 13.
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Figure 14: Welfare and utilization for naive agents with (ci, pi) types, fixing βi = i/n.
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Figure 15: Welfare and utilization for sophisticated agents with (ci, pi) types, fixing βi = i/n.
A.2.2 Impact on Agents with Different Degrees of Bias
We now consider a population of agents with the same distribution of ci, pi and wi as in the previous
setting, but where the total number of agents is fixed at n = 30, and the present bias factor of
agent each agent i is fixed at βi = i/n. Assuming all agents are naive, the average welfare and
utilization of each agent (over 1,000,000 randomly generated economies) is as shown in Figure 14.
Assuming that agents are fully sophisticated instead, the average welfare and utilization of each
agent is as shown in Figure 15.
A.3 Uniform Type Mode
We now consider agents with period 1 values uniformly distributed as in the following Example 7.
Example 7 (Uniform model). In period 1, each agent incurs a uniformly distributed opportunity
cost for using the resource, i.e. V
(1)
i ∼ U[−αi, 0]. If the agent used a resource, she gains a expected
future utility of v
(2)
i = wi > 0. See Figure 16. E
[
V
(1)
i
]
= −λi/2, thus E [Vi] = −λi/2 + wi and
(A1)-(A3) are satisfied as long as wi < 1/λi/2.
Agents’ expected utility functions and DSE bids under the uniform type model are derived in
Appendix B. We consider a type distribution in the population, where αi and wi, are both uniformly
distributed:
αi ∼ U[0, L],
wi ∼ U[0, αi/2].
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fi(v) =
{
1/λi, if v ∈ [−λi, 0],
0, otherwise.
some text v
fi(v)
λi
1/λi
Figure 16: Agent period 1 value distribution under the uniform type model.
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Figure 17: Social welfare and utilization for naive agents with uniform types.
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Figure 18: Social welfare and utilization for sophisticated agents with exponential types.
With wi ∈ (0, αi/2) with probability 1, assumptions (A1)-(A3) are satisfied almost surely. The
results are not sensitive to the choices of parameter L, and we fix L = 20 for all results presented
in the rest of this section.
A.3.1 Varying Resource Scarcity
Fixing the number of resources at m = 5, we first examine the outcomes as the number of agents
varies from 2 to 30. For the scenario where all agents are naive, with βi ∼ U[0, 1] and β˜i = 1.
The average social welfare and utilization over 10,000 randomly generated profiles are as shown
in Figure 17. For economies with fully sophisticated agents, where present-biased factors are
distributed as βi ∼ U[0, 1], but β˜i = βi for all i ∈ N , the social welfare and utilization average over
10,000 randomly generated economies are as shown in Figure 18.
A.3.2 Impact on Agents with Different Degrees of Bias
We now consider a population of agents with the same distribution of αi and wi as in the previous
setting, but where the total number of agents is fixed at n = 30, and the present bias factor of
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Figure 19: Welfare and utilization for naive agents with uniform types, fixing βi = i/n.
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Figure 20: Welfare and utilization for sophisticated agents with uniform types, fixing βi = i/n.
agent each agent i is fixed at βi = i/n. Assuming all agents are naive, the average welfare and
utilization of each agent (over 1,000,000 randomly generated economies) is as shown in Figure 19.
Assuming that agents are fully sophisticated instead, the average welfare and utilization of each
agent is as shown in Figure 20.
B Utilities and DSE Bides Under Different Type Models
B.1 (ci, pi) Type Model
Consider an agent with (ci, pi) type with parameters (ci, pi, wi, βi, β˜i, ) who face a no-show penalty
z ∈ R. In period 1, with probability (1− pi), the agent cannot show up, therefore gets utility −z.
When probability pi, the agent can show up at an immediate cost ci. The agent thinks that she
will show up if and only if
β˜iwi − ci ≥ −zi ⇔ zi ≥ ci − β˜iwi.
Therefore, ci − β˜iwi is the “minimum commitment” the agent thinks that she needs to ever show
up to use the resource, and when z < ci− β˜iwi the agent never shows up and gets utility −z. When
z ≥ ci − β˜iwi, the agent does show up with probability pi. The expected utility of this agent is
therefore:
u˜i(z) =
{ −z, if z < ci − β˜iwi,
(vi − ci)pi − zi(1− pi), if z ≥ ci − β˜iwi.
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When ci− β˜iwi > 0, the agent thinks that she will not show up in a 2nd price auction, in which
case she bids zero. When ci − β˜iwi ≤ 0, she thinks that she will show up when she is able to, and
therefore is willing to bid her expected utility (wi − ci)pi from using the resource. The DSE bids
under SP are therefore:
b∗i,SP =
{
(wi − ci)pi, if ci − β˜iwi ≤ 0,
0, if ci − β˜iwi > 0.
The zero-crossing of the curve (vi − ci)pi − zi(1− pi) is
ϕ˜i =
(wi − ci)pi
1− pi ,
therefore when ϕ˜i < ci− β˜iwi, u˜i(z) < 0 for any z > 0, meaning that the agent will not participate
in the two-bid penalty bidding mechanism. When ϕ˜i ≥ ci − β˜iwi, we know that z0i = ϕ˜i is the
zero-crossing of U˜i(z) , therefore the DSE bid on the maximum acceptable penalty is
b¯∗i =
{
ϕ˜i, if ci − β˜iwi ≤ ϕ˜i,
0, if ci − β˜iwi > ϕ˜i.
We also know that u˜i(z) is monotonically decreasing when z ≥ ci − β˜iwi, therefore after given
a minimum penalty z, the agent will bid in DSE her actual preferred penalty
b∗i = max{ci − β˜iwi, z}.
If agent i is assigned a resource and charged a penalty z, the actual utilization would be
uti(z) = pi · 1{z ≥ ci − βiwi},
since when time 1 comes, she will discount the future utility according to her true discounting
factor βi. The expected social welfare is therefore
swi(z) = pi(wi − ci) · 1{z ≥ ci − βiwi},
and the agent’s actual expected utility is
ui(z) =
{ −z, if z < ci − βiwi,
(vi − ci)pi − zi(1− pi), if z ≥ ci − βiwi.
The first-best utilization that can be achieved by this agent is
utFBi = pi1{ci − β˜iwi ≤ ϕ˜i},
and the first-best welfare is:
swFBi = (wi − ci)pi1{ci − β˜iwi ≤ ϕ˜i}.
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B.2 Exponential Type Model
Consider now the exponential type model, where an agent’s type is parametrized by θi = (λi, wi, βi, β˜i).
In period 1, with penalty z, the agent will show up to use the resource if and only if
V
(1)
i + βiwi ≥ −z ⇔ V (1)i ≥ −z − βiwi.
This happens with probability P
[
V
(1)
i ≥ −z − βiwi
]
= 1− e−λi(z+βiwi), as long as z + βiwi ≥ 0⇔
z ≥ −βiwi. Therefore the actual utilization as a function of penalty z is:
uti(z) =
{
1− e−λi(z+βiwi), if z ≥ −βiwi
0, if z < −βiwi,
and the expected social welfare is:
swi(z) =
{
wi − 1/λi + e−λi(βiwi+z) (1/λi − (1− βi)wi + z)) , if z ≥ −βiwi
0, if z < −βiwi.
With z < −βiwi, the agent never uses the resource, and gets expected utility ui(z) = −z. When
z ≥ −βiwi, the agent gets expected utility:
uti(z) =E
[
(V
(1)
i + wi)1{V (1)i + βiwi ≥ −z}
]
− zP
[
V
(1)
i + βiwi < −z
]
=
∫ z+βiwi
0
(−v + wi)λie−λivdv − ze−λi(βiwi+z)
=wi − 1/λi + e−λi(βiwi+z)(1/λi − (1− βi)wi).
The agent, however, believes that her present bias factor is β˜i, therefore believes that her expected
utility as a function of the penalty z is:
u˜i(z) =
{
wi − 1/λi + e−λi(β˜iwi+z)(1/λi − (1− β˜i)wi), if z ≥ −β˜iwi,
−z, if z < −βiwi.
u˜i(0) ≥ 0 always holds, therefore under SP, the agent is going to bid:
b∗i,SP = u˜i(0) = wi − 1/λi + e−λiβ˜iwi(1/λi − (1− β˜i)wi).
Taking the derivative of u˜i(z) w.r.t. z for z ≥ −β˜iwi, we have:
d
dz
u˜i(z) = e
−λi(β˜iwi+z)(−1 + λiwi(1− β˜i)).
When (A3) holds, wi < 1/λi implies
d
dz u˜i(z) < 0, meaning that u˜i(z) is monotonically decreasing
in z, and that U˜i(z) and u˜i(z) coincide. The zero-crossing (i.e. the maximum acceptable penalty)
is therefore equal to
z0i = −β˜iwi +
1
λi
log
(
1− λiwi(1− β˜i)
1− λiwi
)
.
Under the two-bid penalty bidding mechanism, the agent is going to bid in DSE a maximum penalty
b¯∗i = z
0
i ,
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and once given a minimum penalty z, the agent will then bid the smallest possible b∗i = z. The
first-best social welfare for this agent can be achieved by setting z = (1− βi)wi, in which case the
agent will use the resource if and only if V
(1)
i + wi ≥ 0. The first-best welfare is therefore:
swFBi = wi + (e
−λiwi − 1)/λi.
The first-best utilization is achieved by charging the highest penalty s.t. swi(z) ≥ 0 still holds, i.e.
it is possible for the outcome to be both budget balanced and individually rational. Solving the
equation, we get the maximum penalty that we can charge as:
zFBi = −1/λi + (1− βi)wi +
1
λi
ProductLog
(
−1, e−1+λiwi(−1 + λiwi)
)
.
Here, ProductLog (also called the Lambert W function) is the inverse relation of the function
f(s) = ses. The first best utilization achieved at penalty zFBi is therefore:
utFBi = uti(z
FB
i ) = 1− e1−λiwi+ProductLog(−1,e
−1+λiwi (−1+λiwi)).
B.3 Uniform Type Model
We now consider the uniform type model, where an agent type is parametrized by (αi, wi, βi, β˜i).
In period 1, with penalty z, the agent will show up to use the resource if and only if
V
(1)
i + βiwi ≥ −z ⇔ V (1)i ≥ −z − βiwi.
With V
(1)
i ∼ U[−αi, 0], we know that there are three cases depending on z:
• when z ≤ −βiwi, −z − βiwi is strictly positive, thus the agent never shows up, resulting in
utilization and welfare both equal to zero.
• when z > αi − βiwi, −z − βiwi < −αi so that the agent always shows up. The utilization is
therefore equal to 1, and the welfare is equal to E
[
V
(1)
i + wi
]
= wi − αi/2.
• when z ∈ (−βiwi, αi − βiwi], the agent shows up with probability (z + βiwi)/αi.
Putting the three cases together, we know that the utilization as a function of the penalty z is:
uti(z) =

0, if z < −βiwi,
(z + βiwi)/αi, if − βiwi ≤ z < αi − βiwi,
1, if z > αi − βiwi.
The expected social welfare is:
swi(z) =

0, if z < −βiwi,
z+βiwi
αi
(
wi − z+βiwi2
)
, if − βiwi ≤ z < αi − βiwi,
wi − αi/2, if z > αi − βiwi,
and the agent’s expected utility is:
ui(z) =

−z, if z < −βiwi,
z+βiwi
αi
(
wi − z+βiwi2
)
− z αi−(z+βiwi)αi , if − βiwi ≤ z < αi − βiwi,
wi − αi/2, if z > αi − βiwi.
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u˜i(z) can be obtained simply by replacing βi with β˜i in the above expression. u˜i(0) ≥ 0 always
holds, Therefore under SP, the agent is going to bid:
b∗i,SP = u˜i(0) =
β˜iwi
αi
(
wi − β˜iwi
2
)
.
Note that for −β˜iwi ≤ z < αi − β˜iwi, u˜i(z) can be rewritten in the following quadratic form:
u˜i(z) =
1
2αi
(
z2 − 2(αi − wi)z + w2i β˜i(2− β˜i)
)
.
The minimum is achieved at z∗i = αi − wi, which is
u˜i(z
∗
i ) =
1
2αi
(
−(αi − wi)2 + w2i β˜i(2− β˜i)
)
.
When (A3) holds i.e. E
[
V
(1)
i + wi
]
< 0, we have wi < αi/2, which implies u˜i(z
∗) ≤ 0 for any
β˜i ∈ [0, 1]. As a result, u˜i(z) is monotonically decreasing in z for z ≤ z∗i , monotonically increasing
for z > z∗i , and u˜i(z) ≤ 0 holds for all z < z∗i . This implies that u˜i(z) and U˜i(z) coincide for all z
s.t. u˜i(z) ≥ 0, and that the zero-crossing of u˜i(z) and U˜i(z) (i.e. the maximum acceptable penalty)
is of the form:
z0i = αi − wi −
√
α2i − 2αiwi + (−1 + β˜i)2w2i .
The DSE bid on maximum penalty under the two-bid penalty bidding mechanism is therefore:
b¯∗i = z
0
i ,
and once allocated given a minimum penalty z, the agent will then bid b∗i = z. Similar to the
exponential model, the first-best welfare is achieved by setting the penalty as z = (1 − βi)wi, in
which case
swFBi =
wi
αi
(
wi − wi
2
)
=
w2i
2α
.
The first-best social welfare is achieved at z = 2wi − βiwi, in which case:
utFBi = (2wi − βiwi + βiwi)/αi = 2wi/αi.
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